The aim of this article is to explore, through a hedonic approach, the factors that might explain the price variability for the French-managed fishery of scallop at primary fish markets. In addition to factors classically identified in the current literature like intrinsic product characteristics or markets situation, the characteristics of operators are tested. The relationships of loyalty between sellers and buyers, and market assiduity are notably considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
French market of Scallop (Pecten maximus) is a particular market in the sense that the supply is regulated by management systems that are designed to ensure the sustainability of the resource and therefore associated economic activity. These management systems have implications on market structure as much on supply as on demand with consequences on the price formation mechanisms in both the short and long term. (BjØrndal et al., 1992; McCay et al., 1995; Matulich et al., 1996; Helstad et al., 2005) . These management systems impose production conditions making the products landed in a management area relatively homogeneous in appearance. This relative product homogeneity due to a production under the same conditions is however not translated into price homogeneity. This implies that more attention is needed to devote to other factors than the quality attributes of fish or market conditions in analysis of prices; in particular, it is needed to consider the characteristics of operators, their market behaviour and interpersonal relationships.
Many studies have set out to examine price formation mechanisms for sea products.
Some have concentrated on estimating inverse demand functions (Barten and Bettendorf, 1989; Eales and Unnevehr, 1994; Matsuda, 2007) enabling estimation of how sensitive the relationship between price and quantities landed really is. Others have focused on showing the influence of various brands or ecolabels (Roheim et al., 2007; Roheim et al., 2011; Sogn-Grundvag et al., 2014) , gear types (McConnell and Strand, 2000; Asche and Guillen, 2012; Sogn-Grundvag et al., 2013 , geographical origins (Asche and Guillen, 2012; Guillen and Maynou, 2014) or other attributes of the fish such as size, weight, presentation, or even colour (Gates 1974; McConnell and Strand, 2000; Carroll et al., 2001; Asche and Guttormsen, 2001; Alfnes et al., 2006; Smith and Gopalakrishnan, 2010; Zimmermann and Heino, 2013; Dey et al., 2014; Sogn-Grundvag et al., 2014) . Helstad et al. (2005) have chosen an approach that closely scrutinises the links between selling methods (auction or direct sales) and price. Others have focused on how the relationships between buyers and sellers have impacted prices (Kirman and Vriend, 2000; Gallegati et al., 2011; Vignes and Etienne, 2011; Cirillo et al., 2012; Fluvià et al., 2012) but this type of effect has never been included in hedonic models.
The scallop (Pecten maximus) fishery is one of the largest fisheries in France (Meunier et al., 2013) . Existing management systems are based mainly on regulation of inputs, and are characterised by the granting of fishing licenses (numerus clausus), limitations on fishing effort, and a calendar governing the duration of the fishing season (Fifas et al., 2003; Alban and Boncoeur, 2008; OCDE, 2012) . The scallop is a sedentary species, with stocks distributed throughout the English
Channel. The fishery is made up accordingly of several sub-fisheries with differing management practices to take into account the particular ecological, biological and socio-economic characteristics encountered in each area (Fifas et al., 2003; Guyader et al., 2004; Binet, 2010; Guyader et al., 2013) . These characteristics favour a relatively heterogeneous range of products landed in the various auction halls around the English Channel, with as many sub-markets as there are management system zones and relatively homogeneous products within the same sub-market.
The licensing system implies that fishers have very few opportunities to operate in different management areas (Arzel et al., 2005; Alban and Boncoeur, 2008) . As a consequence most of the fishers tend to limit their fishing operation in only one management area. Inertia does not only concern fishers but also, to a certain extent, the buyers on primary fish markets. The latter rarely vary their sourcing and supply sites (Lesur-Irichabeau et al., 2014) despite the opening up of opportunities to buy on the various sub-markets thanks to the computerisation of auction halls and the introduction of remote buying systems (Guillotreau et al., 2006) .
The objective of this article is to use a hedonic approach to explore those factors that are likely to explain the variability of the price of the scallop in a same management area, while giving equal consideration to characteristics such as the market, the products, their substitutability as a function of their origin, modalities and characteristics of the transactions. Particular attention is given to the influence of characteristics of the operators and their relationships at primary markets. Because we only study the transactions on the primary market, we assume that buyers are intermediaries acting in accordance with their knowledge of willingness to pay for the next buyers, whether intermediate or final consumers, given scallop characteristics.
II. FRENCH SCALLOP FISHERIES
The scallop (Pecten maximus) is the leading species landed in France (15.8 thousand tons) and ranks fourth in terms of value (€ 37.6 million) in 2012. The 8 main fishing zones -referred to below as 'management areas' (MA) -are located in the French territorial waters, with the Saint Brieuc Bay (MA_3) and the Bay of the Seine (MA_6) accounting for 37% and 28% respectively of the total production in the English Channel (Fig. 1) 1 . The various sub-markets considered correspond to the different management areas. Prices differ from one management area to another, with a minimum average annual price of 2.1 €/kg in MA_3 and a maximum of 3.9 €/kg in MA_1.
1 The other French fishing grounds located in the Bay of Biscay represent less than 4% of the French production figure and are not considered in this study. 
Fig. 1. Scallop management areas and primary fish markets locations
As each zone is managed independently of the others (Fifas et al. 2003) , the structures of the fleets are heterogeneous. As the table 1 shows, the vessel length and engine power almost consistently increase from West to East across the Channel, with a minimum of 9.4 m (87 kW) in zone MA_1 and a maximum of 16.7 m (312 kW) in zone MA_8. As the number of authorised fishing days is also defined by the individual management system, each sub-market differs in terms of the number of days of activity (days with transactions) with a more sustained activity in the East than in the West. The number of buyers 2 in primary fish market halls is relatively homogeneous between fishing grounds. As indicated in Table 1 , the majority of fishing grounds are characterized by a predominance of fishmongers which are intermediary operators.
They are key operators to the extent that they supply purchasing services for the major national retailers. These central purchasing services are responsible for centralizing purchasing operations so they can be subsequently redistributed over the national territory. Whatever the fishing ground, part of the production figure is bought by retail operators, mainly fish merchants, for resale to the end consumer.
Some buyers may, in certain instances, be import and/or export operators. The number of buyers in the management area 3 is relatively large compared to other management areas due to the obligation for fishers to sell their entire production at auction hall. Fishers have to buy their own production if they want to sell it themselves. 3 We refer also to the vessel or to the fisher to designate 'seller'.
All buyers at the primary fish market are intermediaries but not in the same way.
Fish merchants are, for example, intermediaries between fisher and the end consumer. Their marketing zone is, usually at any rate, in the vicinity of the fishing grounds themselves, in the framework of short circuits. Fish mongers are larger scale operators, notably with an intermediary role for central purchasing services and supermarkets distribution networks when the latter are not themselves buyers in the primary fish market. Processors only transform the product, mainly into for scallop frozen meat.
III. METHOD AND DATA

Hedonic price function and marginal effects
A hedonic price function is estimated for each of the eight management areas under consideration. The functional form selected differs depending on the fishing ground, but the general form is the following:
where X and ' X are continuous variables which, depending on the model, are in logarithmic or normal format and Z, are the dummy variables. Each model is estimated using the same set of explanatory variables. From estimated coefficients, it will be possible to calculate the marginal effects that enable us to quantify the sensitivity of the price to a variation in a component of the latter. The calculation of these marginal effects differs according to the nature of the explanatory variables. The months of the year (January to December) are tested to the extent that previous studies mention that there exists a certain seasonality in consumption habits for this product independently of the seasonality of production (Abso Conseil, 2010) . In order to take market conditions into account, daily production at local and national scales (local daily supply and national daily supply) and the number of buyers (nb of buyers) are included in the analysis. Seller production (vol/%) and buyer purchase (vol/%) represent the scallop daily market shares of the different operators expressed either as a quantity, or as a percentage.
6 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/ 7 https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/ 8 A previous study (Foucher, et al., 2015) showed that there is as many markets as management areas. This explains why we perform a model for each management area. The potential interdependence of markets however taken into account through the variable "national daily supply". A consequence of the existence of eight markets is that explanatory variables of price are not the same for all models. Barten and Bettendorf, 1989; Härdle and Kirman, 1995; McConnell and Strand, 2000*; Carroll et al., 2001*; Kristofersson and Rickertsen, 2007*; Gallegati et al., 2011; Fluvià et al., 2012; Dey et al., 2014; Guillen and Maynou, 2014* national daily supply national daily supply Local daily individual production seller production (vol) volume produce daily seller production (%) proportion of the daily production Local daily individual purchase buyer purchase (vol) volume bought daily buyer purchase (%) proportion of the daily production purchases Gallegati et al., 2011; Vignes and Etienne, 2011; Cirillo et al., 2012; Fluvià et al., 2012 seller loyalty rate (vol) seller loyalty rate based on volume exchange buyer loyalty rate (lot) buyer loyalty rate based on number of transactions buyer loyalty rate (vol) buyer loyalty rate based on volume exchange
Note: 'S' or 'B' indicate variable concerning respectively sellers or buyers. * Articles using a hedonic price modelling 
IV. RESULTS
Market conditions
Among the sources of variability of scallop prices in a given management area explored, the sensitivity due to the relationship between prices and quantities (local and national supply) was considered. For the markets under consideration, the pertinent relationship is given by an inverse demand curve, the quantity of scallops landed locally each day (local daily supply) being strongly constrained by the specific system of regulation to each zone. The results are significant for all zones with negative price-quantity flexibility coefficients. These coefficients are relatively weak (-0.03 and -0.05) for the two main production zones MA_3 and MA_6 (Tables 4(a) to 4(h)). For the other zones, the higher the estimated coefficient, the lower the production level.
Even though the products sourced by the different fishing grounds are heterogeneous, the significance of the variable national daily supply for all management areas indicates that there is a certain substitutability between products sourced from different management areas. However, the degree of interaction is relatively high for both the main production zones and in particular for zone MA_6. This is much lower, and up to 450 times lower for the other production zones. This leads us to believe that while a certain integration of markets does exist, it is only partial.
The results also show that the higher the number of buyers (nb of buyers) in each market place, the higher the prices will be. This expected effect of the number of buyers on the conditions of competition and price formation is meanwhile specific to each zone. This differentiated effect depending on the zone is, at this stage, difficult to explain. β ME β ME β ME β ME β ME β ME β ME β ME The results show overall that the larger the volumes exchanged with particular sellers, the lower the prices concluded for those transactions. The same type of effect exists for sellers, but only in certain zones. When we consider loyalty in terms of the frequency of transactions, the results show that the more sellers remain loyal to particular buyers, the higher are the prices. This type of effect is almost non-existent for buyers. When we compare the overall marginal effects of loyalty rates in the different production grounds we observe greater sensitivity of prices to the frequency of transactions between a seller and the same buyer for the scallop stocks in management areas MA_1, 2, 6, 7. For the other scallop stocks, there is greater sensitivity to the quantities exchanged between one buyer and a single seller.
To these effects of loyalty seem to be added the effects of assiduity, as defined by the frequency with which operators are present in the different management areas (diligence rate (S/B)). The effects concern sellers to a greater extent than buyers. For the latter, only two zones are concerned with the different effects that do not allow us to draw clear conclusions on the impact of this variable on prices. Conversely, in the case of sellers, the effect is positive for two thirds of the zones concerned, which highlights the existence of a clear 'assiduity gain', or advantage. The more specific the product range considered (scallop with coral or larger size), the higher this effect seems to be.
The results show also that there exists a negative relationship between the market share of a buyer (buyer purchase (%)) in the management area and the transaction price. This effect has a tendency to cancel itself out for the two main management areas where production and the number of buyers are high. Finally, when several types of transaction exist within each management area, we note that sale by auction will give more added value to scallops than to other types of transaction (over the counter sales, or contract). This is particularly true in the East of the Channel.
Characteristics of operators
Besides relationships between operators, different individual characteristics of operators were tested. The economic dependence of sellers and buyers (seller
dependence rate (year/month), buyer dependence rate (year/month)) vis-à-vis
scallops is a variable of considerable interest since it allows us to take into account the opportunities and constraints of operators. The dependence of fishers influences prices negatively only in the management areas furthest to the East, where in other respects, over the counter sales concluded between buyers and sellers are the most frequent. We can observe the opposite effect as regards buyers who, the more dependent they are, appear globally more willing to buy the more expensive scallops.
Meanwhile, we may note certain exceptions in management areas MA_3 and 7. This result may notably be explained by the presence of processing operators specialising in scallops, and for whom the purchasing behaviours are different from other buyers.
Where these are significant, the effects of buyers status on prices are those as expected. Globally, willingness to pay will be higher when the buyer is a direct intermediary between the fisher and the end consumer. So, on average, and for a same management area, the consent of the fish merchants is higher than that of the fishmongers, or that of the transformers, the fish merchants selling directly to the end consumer. Conversely, among fishmongers who are just intermediaries for wholesalers and central purchasing unit of supermarket chains, there is less willingness to pay.
The integration of buyers in international trade, as measured by the fact of being an importer (buyer importer) or exporter of scallops (buyer exporter), also has a negative and positive influence on the purchase price respectively. This means that willingness to pay of importer buyers (exporters) is relatively lower (relatively higher) than it would be for non-importers (non-exporters). The negative effect is explained quite easily since fresh scallops are imported at lower prices than market prices in France (Abso Conseil, 2010). When it is significant, this effect tends to strengthen in the East of the zone to the extent that a major proportion of imports take place in these areas.
Consumers preferences
While systems of management influence the structure of demand, the latter is also linked to consumer preferences. So parameter estimates concerning monthly effects (January to December) confirm previous qualitative studies ( Abso Conseil, 2010) , that note the existence of a degree of seasonality in consumption habits for this product independent of the seasonality of production. The scallop has always been considered a festive item, with consumption increasing during Catholic feast periods This type of result is consistent with other studies, the larger-sized products being often preferred by end consumers (Gates, 1974) . Even while the effects linked to the quality of the products 9 are not significant, there can be a differentiation of products within each management zone. In the case of the scallop, and biological marine resources generally, the dynamic of the species relies on the nature of the exploited habitats (Engel et al., 1999; Knudby et al., 2010) . Even while it is not possible to differentiate the various fishing zones within each management zone in detail, the size of vessels (vessel length) can be used as a good proxy of the gradient of exploitation (distance to the coast) to the extent that there is a good correlation between this and the vessel size (Guyader et al., 2013) . The significant and positive (0.06-0.08) influence of vessel length on price for most of the management areas seems to confirm the existence of scallops of different quality, better valorised on the market and non-accessible to smaller fishing units.
V. DISCUSSION
The results obtained in our estimations are consistent with those of studies on price formation mechanisms for fish at the primary fish market. So the intrinsic characteristics of scallops such as size or quality, and consumer preferences explain the variability of prices.
Price-quantity relationships (local daily supply, national daily supply) reveal the existence of two value chain models. On the one hand, we find production zones 9 The product quality here refers to the appreciation criteria as defined by European regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2406/96 of 26 November 1996 laying down common marketing standards for certain fishery products).
oriented towards local markets or niche markets with capacities for absorption that are relatively limited; and on the other hand, there are two production zones more destined to the national market, with a purchasing structure characterised by the presence of transformers and fishmongers capable of absorbing variations in production (MA_3 et MA_6).
Price-quantity relationships that are revealed also translate the differences of perception on the part of buyers, depending on the position they occupy in the supply side of the value chain relatively to the end consumer. As fish products from the two main scallop stocks studied (mainly in the case of MA_3) are destined to supply the sea food transformation sector, the inherent quality of the scallops are less a criterion for purchasing on the primary fish market. For buyers in these zones, scallops are perceived as being relatively homogeneous, and this makes them more sensitive to variations in national production.
The different levels of price sensitivity with regard to the 'loyalty effects' we considered, depending on the type of operator and the type of relationship, do not seem to be linked to the size of the management areas, nor to the structure of the market. However, as indicated earlier, as far as buyers are concerned, it is possible to link loyalty effects with assiduity effects. These assiduity effects would then reflect any effects of reputation that are always exacerbated in the case of products that are more specific (scallop with coral, larger size, or scallop destined for the transformation sector). In scallop stocks where buyers are looking for a particular level of product quality, only the more assiduous sellers will be identifiably able to guarantee buyers the quality they are seeking.
Operator characteristics are also be quite instructive to understand price formation mechanisms for scallops. As the results show, the constraints borne by operators linked to their dependence, have a direct effect on price. So we conclude that the more dependent sellers will agree to lower prices, and the more dependent buyers to higher prices. Nonetheless, we should draw a distinction between this latter result in the case of transformers. Because of their specialisation, they exhibit a dependence on the scallop that is relatively high because their purchases of sea food concern almost exclusively this species. The willingness to pay of this type of operator is therefore not linked to their dependence vis-à-vis the scallop, but is linked to the power of negotiation they have by dint of the volumes purchased.
This can be seen to be the more justifiable in proportion to the degree of transformation the scallops are subject to before resale, engendering additional costs in relation to buyers direct linked with the end consumer. This is confirmed, moreover, by our results concerning buyer types. The latter show that prices can vary depending on the level at which the buyer is situated in relation to the end consumer (as a direct intermediary between fisher and end consumer, or as an intermediary between fisher and another intermediary). As indicated earlier, for the transformers that must shell and freeze the scallops before they are sold on to supermarket chains or specialised distribution networks, the pressure exerted by downstream operators can be very strong, explaining their relative lack of willingness to pay for the scallops as compared with fish merchants. Following through, we have shown that for all types of buyers who do not sell directly to the end consumer, the pressure likely to be exerted downstream of the supply chain will ultimately translate into the pressure on fishers that yields lower prices.
The low substitutability of scallops on the French markets, linked partly to scallop quality that varies according to the characteristics of the scallop stocks, is also due in fact to the scallop being a niche product outside the national territory. Generally speaking, the positive link established between the exporter status of the buyer, and the price, could be interpreted as a kind of market tension on the offering expressed as a certain buyer overbidding. This is not the case as regards the scallop. As regards the latter, the effect can be explained above all by the fact that exported products target specific markets where the prices negotiated are relatively high. Demand for these market segments corresponds to niche products available only in certain zones (MA_1, MA5 and MA_8).
VI. CONCLUSION
The various scallop fisheries in the Channel are managed differently to take into account their ecological, biological or socio-economic characteristics. This engenders a relatively heterogeneous range of products landed and sold on in the different auction halls in the Channel, with as many sub-markets as there are management zone-systems. However, the products landed are relatively homogeneous within each management zone because they are produced under quite similar conditions. Notwithstanding, there is no corresponding homogeneity among the prices set for products that have the same identified characteristics.
These differences in price could be explained by the presence of characteristics that are different from those usually highlighted in current literature on price determinants for fish on primary markets. We have notably shown that operator loyalty and assiduity effects also contribute to price formation mechanisms. Are (Gujarati, 2004) . 
